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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA), it stated that it was seeking to provide a fair, federal forum for 
cases of national import and interest.1  In the section of CAFA titled 
“Findings and Purposes,” Congress claimed to be reacting to abusive 
state-court class action practices that yielded unfair results, undermined 
public respect for the judicial system, undermined interstate commerce 
and the national judicial system, and usurped the legislative prerogatives 
of other states.2  CAFA addresses those problems by providing expansive 
diversity-based original jurisdiction over multistate class actions and by 
providing for ready removal to federal court when such cases are filed in 
state court. 
CAFA represents reform by resettlement.  Rather than attempting to 
regulate what was happening in the state courts, Congress chose to 
reform class action practice by shifting class actions from the state-court 
dockets, where abuse was allegedly rampant, to the federal-court 
                                                     
 ∗ Welcome D. & W. DeVier Pierson Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I 
want to thank the University of Kansas School of Law and the Kansas Law Review for hosting this 
symposium and inviting me to participate.  I also want to thank the University of Oklahoma College 
of Law for supporting this research project and Richard Sutterfield at Kellpro, Inc. for his assistance 
in obtaining data from the sixty-four counties that utilize the Oklahoma District Court Records 
electronic docket system. 
 General thanks cannot begin to describe my gratitude and indebtedness to Isaac Ellis and 
Meredith Walck, my student research assistants, who did most of the really tedious work gathering, 
filtering, and coding the data.  This acknowledgement is small recompense for their labors, and I 
hope that someday they will find it in their hearts to forgive me.  Finally, much of the credit (and 
none of the blame) for this project belongs to Emery Lee and Tom Willging at the Federal Judicial 
Center, who helped greatly with the design of the study and provided me with access to their federal-
court data. 
 1. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.  See generally Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (Findings 
and Purposes). 
 2. Class Action Fairness Act § 2. 
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dockets, where abuse was thought less prevalent and where Congress 
could more directly exercise regulatory authority in the future.  This 
docket transfer from state court to federal court is referred to as the 
“CAFA effect.”3  While people debated about how pronounced the 
CAFA effect would be,4 there was little doubt that it would occur. 
CAFA took effect on February 18, 2005, over four years ago.5  What 
has happened since then?  Has CAFA in fact shifted nationwide state-law 
class actions from state court to federal court?  If so, how large has the 
shift been?  Has the shift been uniform across the states and the federal 
courts in those states? 
Some of the data needed to try to answer those questions are being 
collected from the federal-court system.  After CAFA took effect, the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules asked the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC) to study federal-court class action practice in the wake of CAFA.6  
The FJC began collecting data in 2005 and has been presenting interim 
reports to the Advisory Committee since 2006.7  One of the interim 
findings has been that there has been an increase in the number of state-
law class actions filed in federal court since CAFA took effect on 
February 18, 2005.8  When presenting these findings, however, the FJC 
researchers have been quick to disclaim any conclusion that CAFA has 
shifted state-law class actions from state court to federal court.  That 
would require knowing whether state-court class action filings have 
experienced a corresponding decrease.9 
Getting corresponding state-court data is no small task.  As of this 
date, there is no centralized general database of state-court class action 
data.  Thus, the only way to get corresponding state-court data is for 
researchers to collect and analyze those data on a state-by-state basis.  
Even then, there is no assurance that any particular state will have 
                                                     
 3. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on 
the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1748 
(2008). 
 4. See id. at 1740–42 (discussing the range of predictions). 
 5. Class Action Fairness Act § 9. 
 6. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS 
ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1 (2008), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf. 
 7. The FJC’s interim publications are available at the FJC’s website.  Federal Judicial Center, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf. 
 8. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 5–7. 
 9. Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1748 (“To demonstrate a CAFA effect on diversity cases 
conclusively, one would need accurate information about class action activity in the state courts 
comparable to that collected by the Center about class action activity in the federal courts.”). 
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reliable or accessible records in this area.10  The result is that collecting 
parallel state-court data likely will be a hit-and-miss proposition at best. 
Some data do exist.  A limited study of class action activity in 
Madison County, Illinois—a jurisdiction regularly cited by class action 
critics as a class action hellhole—showed a very substantial drop in class 
action activity after CAFA.11  A much more comprehensive study of 
class action activity is underway in California.  In collaboration with the 
University of California Hastings College of Law, the Office of Court 
Research (OCR) of the California Administrative Office of the Court 
initiated a project to study class actions in the California state courts.12  
The OCR study currently has data from 2000 through mid-2006, with 
plans to update those data through 2008.13  The OCR study of California 
class actions is hugely important.  California is the largest state in the 
union (by population14) and has the largest economy of the states.15  It 
also has one of the largest court systems.16  If we could collect data from 
                                                     
 10. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1500 (2008) (“I am aware of no reliable data, historical 
or current, concerning state court class actions, and I doubt that reliable data exist for most states.”); 
Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1763 (“The lack of state court data on class actions stems from 
multiple sources, including the lack of necessary resources to collect the data in the state systems 
and the lack of common computerized case management systems.”). 
 11. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1593, 1609–10 (2008) (noting that Madison County’s judiciary also underwent reforms during this 
period but stating that a connection between CAFA and the drop in filings was strongly suggested). 
 12. See HILARY HEHMAN, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION, 2000-2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT 1 (2009), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference 
/documents/class action-lit-study.pdf. 
 13. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FACT SHEET: STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION 3 (2010), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets 
/sccal.pdf. 
 14. U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States: Resident 
Population—July 2008, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/ranks/rank01.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Resident Population Rankings] (resident population ranking as of 
July 2008). 
 15. U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States: Gross 
Domestic Product by State in Current Dollars, 2007, http://www.census.gov/compendia 
/statab/2010/ranks/rank28.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Gross Domestic Product 
Rankings] (gross domestic product by state in current dollars for 2007). 
 16. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) compiles annual reports on the work of the 
state courts.  See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007: A 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 5 (2008), http://www.ncsconline 
.org/D_Research/csp/2007B_files/Examining Final - 2007 - 1 - Whole; COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2007: SUPPLEMENT TO EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS, 2007, at 6 (2008), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/State Court 
Caseload Statistics 2007.pdf.  Because state court systems vary in their structure and in the ways in 
which they track docket statistics and workloads, it would be difficult to unequivocally say that any 
one state had the largest court system.  Nonetheless, even a casual reading of the caseload statistics 
assembled by the NCSC will confirm that California has one of the largest state court systems both 
in terms of number of courts and total caseload. 
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only one state, it would not be inappropriate to select California.  That 
being said, the qualities that make California so significant also make it 
atypical of most states.  Whatever impact CAFA has had on class action 
practice in California, it would be dangerous at best to extrapolate that 
impact to the other forty-nine states. 
This study offers a look at the impact of CAFA on a very different 
state.  Oklahoma lies in the heart of the heartland, and not just in terms of 
geography.  It is the twenty-eighth largest state in terms of population17 
and the eighteenth largest state in terms of area.18  The Oklahoma 
economy, while diverse overall, has significant concentrations in 
agriculture and natural resources.19  Oklahoma ranks twenty-ninth among 
the states in terms of gross state product.20  In most senses of the term, 
one fairly can describe Oklahoma as a middle state.  It certainly offers a 
contrast to California. 
There is another reason why Oklahoma makes for an interesting case 
study.  During the 2000s, Oklahoma gained a reputation as being a 
friendly forum for class actions.  Beginning in 2000, the Texas Supreme 
Court issued a series of decisions that drastically curtailed class 
certification in the Texas state courts.21  Sensing the need for greener 
pastures, class action lawyers followed the first leg of the Chisholm 
Trail22 and crossed the Red River into Oklahoma.23  Once there, they 
found a much more welcoming class action environment.  For example, 
the Texas courts required trial plans and could certify a class only if the 
                                                     
 17. Resident Population Rankings, supra note 14. 
 18. See The US50, Listing of the 50 States Ranked by Size in Square Miles, http:// 
www.theus50.com/area.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 19. See Oklahoma Dep’t of Commerce, Economic & Business Data, http://www.okcommerce 
.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=310&Itemid= 
391 (follow “Gross State Product” hyperlink; then follow “1997 to 2008 BEA Oklahoma Gross 
Domestic Product by Industry” hyperlink). 
 20. Gross Domestic Product Rankings, supra note 15. 
 21. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 669–70 (Tex. 2004) 
(requiring trial courts to conduct a rigorous choice of law analysis before determining 
predominance); Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000) (requiring trial courts to 
rigorously analyze the certification requirements and rejecting the “certify now, worry later” 
approach).  See generally Alistair B. Dawson & Geoff A. Gannaway, In Memoriam: Texas Class 
Actions, 72 TEX. B.J. 366, 368 (2009) (“The most significant deterrent for Texas class actions has 
undoubtedly been the relentless tightening of certification requirements by the Texas Supreme 
Court.”). 
 22. The Chisholm Trail stretched from Texas to Kansas.  Along the Chisholm Trail, 
http://www.thechisholmtrail.com/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  Millions of head of cattle were 
rounded up in Texas and driven north, through Oklahoma, to the stockyards of Kansas to be sold and 
shipped to Chicago or other points east.  Id. 
 23. See Dawson & Gannaway, supra note 21, at 373 (“Cases that used to be filed in Texas are 
now being filed in states such as Oklahoma and Arkansas.”). 
0.6.0_GENSLER FINAL 5/10/2010  12:13:24 PM 
2010] THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CAFA EFFECT 813 
plaintiff could presently show that it met all of the criteria for 
certification.24  In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not require 
trial plans and even directed the Oklahoma trial courts to err on the side 
of certification under the view that the trial court could always decertify 
later.25 
Class action lawyers also found more favorable choice-of-law rules 
in Oklahoma.  In several decisions in the early 2000s, the Texas Supreme 
Court erected choice-of-law obstacles to certification by (1) holding that 
trial courts could not find predominance without conducting a proper 
choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the claims would be subject 
to one law or the law of multiple states;26 and (2) interpreting Texas’s 
version of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to pick, for each 
class member, the law of the class member’s home state.27  In contrast, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed Oklahoma’s version of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as selecting a single law—the 
law of the defendant’s home state—to govern the warranty claims of all 
class members in a nationwide warranty class action.28  In so doing, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court greatly enhanced the odds of getting class 
certification by eliminating the potentially fatal obstacle of having to 
apply multiple laws.29 
All of these factors converged in the notorious Compaq v. Lapray 
litigation.  That case, originally filed in Texas state court, sought class 
certification of a national class of computer purchasers and asserted 
claims for breach of warranty.30  The trial court granted class 
certification and in 2002 the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed.31  
While the certification order in Lapray was on appeal to the Texas 
Supreme Court, the class lawyers protectively filed a parallel suit in 
Cleveland County, Oklahoma, in 2003, where it proceeded under the 
                                                     
 24. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. 2004) (trial plan 
required for every certification order); Sw. Ref. Co., 22 S.W.3d at 435 (trial plan assures that the trial 
court has fulfilled its duty to rigorously analyze all certification requirements). 
 25. Perry v. Meek, 618 P.2d 934, 940 (Okla. 1980) (“The pragmatically correct action, in the 
face of a close question as to certification, has been said to sustain certification because if it develops 
later during the course of the trial that the order is ill-advised, the order is always (prior to judgment 
on the merits,) subject to modification.”); see also Masquat v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 195 P.3d 48, 
53 (Okla. 2008) (same (quoting Perry, 618 P.2d at 940)); Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
164 P.3d 1028, 1032 (Okla. 2006) (“[I]n the face of a close question as to certification, the Court has 
held that the pragmatic action is to sustain certification.”). 
 26. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 698 (Tex. 2002). 
 27. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 681 (Tex. 2004). 
 28. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 625–26 (Okla. 2003). 
 29. See id. 
 30. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 661–62. 
 31. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 79 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tex. App. 2002). 
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name of Grider v. Compaq Computer Corp.32  In May 2004, the Texas 
Supreme Court reversed the certification order in Lapray in part on its 
finding that Texas law would not apply to all class members.33  The 
following year, in September 2005, the Cleveland County court found 
that Texas law would apply to all class members under Oklahoma 
choice-of-law rules and certified essentially the same national warranty 
class that the Texas Supreme Court had rejected.  In 2008, the Cleveland 
County court approved a class-wide settlement with a stated face value 
of $630 million but that mostly consisted of coupons.34  The only people 
to receive hard cash in the settlement were the class lawyers; they 
received $40 million in attorney’s fees plus almost $8 million for costs 
and expenses.35 
The class action conditions in Oklahoma during this period did not 
go unnoticed.  It was at this time that the American Tort Reform 
Association (ATRA) began publishing its annual report of so-called 
“judicial hellholes.”  In 2004, Oklahoma made the “Dishonorable 
Mention” list with the comment that “plaintiffs’ lawyers from 
surrounding states, particularly Texas, stand ready at the Oklahoma 
border.  Some have already begun to stake a claim on its courthouses.”36  
In an amicus brief in support of DaimlerChrysler’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari, the United States Chamber of Commerce singled out certain 
states as being havens for abusive class action practices and concluded 
that “Oklahoma will undoubtedly draw lawyers from across the nation 
who are attempting to certify nationwide classes.”37  Oklahoma’s 
reputation even extended to Congress.  A Senate Report accompanying 
                                                     
 32. See generally Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2015–18 (2008) (describing in particular how the lawyers who had filed the 
well-known Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray suit in Texas later filed essentially the same action 
in Oklahoma under the name Grider v. Compaq Computer Corp.).  A second, parallel suit against 
Hewlett-Packard Co. (which purchased Compaq) was also filed in Cleveland County and captioned 
Barrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., CJ-2003-967 (Cleveland County, Oklahoma).  The Grider and 
Barrett cases were consolidated for certification and settlement on December 11, 2007. 
 33. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 681. 
 34. Settlement Agreement and Release, Barrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CJ-2003-967 
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/getcaseinformation.asp? 
submitted=true&number=CJ-2003-967&db=Cleveland&viewtype=oscn. 
 35. Order granting final approval to Class Action Settlement and Final Judgment at 2, 5, Barrett 
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CJ-2003-967 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 9, 2008), http://www.oscn.net 
/applications/oscn/getcaseinformation.asp?submitted=true&number=CJ-2003-
967&db=Cleveland&viewtype=oscn. 
 36. AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, 33, http://www.atra.org/reports 
/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf. 
 37. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 12, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ysbrand, 542 U.S. 937 (2004) (No. 03-1342), 2004 WL 
1174634, at *12. 
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CAFA referred specifically to Ysbrand in its discussion of how states can 
undermine basic principles of federalism by applying the law of a single 
state to all class members of a nationwide class action.38 
By reciting this history, I do not mean to take any position here on 
the tort-reform debate generally.  Nor do I mean to make any normative 
judgments about the state of Oklahoma’s class action practice during this 
period,39 though I did express after Ysbrand that Oklahoma’s class action 
environment was likely to attract additional national class action 
activity.40  My point here is simply this: to the extent CAFA was a 
response to alleged forum-shopping in the national class action market, 
then it is particularly apt to look at the impact of CAFA on Oklahoma as 
a state that was developing a reputation as one of the preferred forums. 
With this background in place, I now turn to the body of the Article.  
It proceeds in two Parts.  Part II briefly discusses the purpose and design 
of CAFA.  Part II shows how the expansive jurisdiction and removal 
provisions of CAFA sweep in most multistate class actions of any 
significant size, creating the potential for a massive transfer of national 
state-law class actions from state court to federal court.  Part II further 
shows, in contrast, that while CAFA contains exceptions for “in-state” 
class actions, they are very narrow and leave little room for lawyers to 
structure state-specific class actions that would fall outside CAFA’s 
removal provisions. 
Part III presents findings from my empirical study of Oklahoma class 
actions.  The study found a significant reduction in class action filings in 
the Oklahoma state courts post-CAFA.  However, the Oklahoma federal 
courts experienced a similar reduction in class action filings during this 
same period.  These data suggest that CAFA has not led to a transfer of 
class actions from Oklahoma state court to the federal courts in 
Oklahoma.  But national federal-court data from the FJC show an overall 
                                                     
 38. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 25 & n.111 (2005). 
 39. Oklahoma’s status as a class friendly forum may already be over.  Effective November 1, 
2009, Oklahoma’s class action rule was amended as part of a comprehensive tort-reform bill.  H.B. 
1603 (Okla. 2009) (enacted).  Among the reforms are a provision providing for de novo review of 
certification decisions, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2023(C)(2) (2009), a provision restricting the 
inclusion of out-of-state residents in a class without the defendant’s consent, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 
§ 2023(D)(3), and a fee-award provision requiring that class lawyers who obtain coupons or other 
similar forms of compensation be paid in kind, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2023(G)(4)(f).  Oklahoma’s 
recent round of class action reform supports the view expressed by some that, over time, the problem 
of so-called “class action hellholes” will often be self-correcting.  See Burbank, supra note 10, at 
1522–23; Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1767–68 (2008). 
 40. Steven S. Gensler, Civil Procedure: Class Certification and the Predominance Requirement 
Under Oklahoma Section 2023(B)(3), 56 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 326 (2003). 
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increase in diversity class actions post-CAFA, with very large increases 
in certain circuits.  Taken together, the data suggest that CAFA may have 
shifted class actions from state court to federal court generally, but not 
evenly, as plaintiffs bringing these new federal filings targeted what they 
perceived to be the more favorable federal districts and circuits.  
Consider national warranty class actions like Ysbrand and Grider.  Pre-
CAFA they were brought in Oklahoma state court.  The CAFA effect for 
cases like these may be that they are now brought in federal courts in 
other parts of the country like the Third Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. 
In addition to filing rates, my empirical study collected Oklahoma 
state-court data on class certification decisions and outcomes in certified 
cases.  Part III provides interim findings on those issues as follows: (1) a 
motion to certify the case as a class action was made in approximately 
half of the cases; (2) when a motion to certify was made, it was granted 
over half of the time and seldom denied; and (3) when certification was 
granted, by far the most likely outcome was a settlement. 
II. THE PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF CAFA 
When Congress passed CAFA, it did so with a clearly stated 
purpose—to shift state-law class actions that were of nationwide or 
multistate scope from the state courts to the federal courts.41  In CAFA, 
Congress made legislative findings about the state of class action practice 
in the United States.  It began with a conditional endorsement of class 
actions, stating that class actions “are an important and valuable part of 
the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of 
legitimate claims.”42  But the clear thrust of the findings was to lay a 
foundation for reform by attacking what they characterized as “abuses of 
the class action device,” including situations where class actions result in 
large fees for lawyers while providing no real benefit to the class 
members.43  According to Congress, these abuses—which Congress 
implicitly and indirectly laid on the doorstep of the state courts—were 
                                                     
 41. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  While some CAFA critics have denounced the articulated policy 
justification, or have argued that CAFA fails to serve those policies, it is surely true that Congress 
could validly use jurisdictional reform to curb the abuses that allegedly were occurring in nationwide 
class actions pending in certain state courts.  See Marcus, supra note 39, at 1768.  As CAFA critic 
Professor Burbank has noted, “[a] reasonable member of Congress in 2005 could have concluded 
that there was a need to change the balance of power in forum selection for class litigation between 
plaintiffs and defendants.”  Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and 
Federalism—Precis, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 11, 11 (2007). 
 42. Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(1). 
 43. Id. § 2(a)(3). 
0.6.0_GENSLER FINAL 5/10/2010  12:13:24 PM 
2010] THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CAFA EFFECT 817 
undermining the national judicial system and harming the national 
economy.44  Congress’s findings also reflected the view that class action 
lawyers were manipulating the system, imposing extraordinary costs on 
defendants while providing no real benefit to the class members who 
were allegedly harmed.45  Thus, the declared purpose of CAFA was to 
restore fairness to the resolution of national class actions “by providing 
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance 
under diversity jurisdiction.”46 
Whether or not Congress’s view of the situation was correct or 
sincere, it is certainly clear that the jurisdictional framework in place 
before CAFA allowed for the development of a national class action 
market and for the possibility of state-to-state forum shopping.  As a 
function of personal jurisdiction, it was a truly national market.  In most 
nationwide class actions, the national nature of the conduct, the 
availability of general contacts-based jurisdiction, and the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts regarding personal 
jurisdiction over absent class members combined to enable the putative 
named plaintiff and her lawyer to bring suit in just about any state in the 
country.47  And under the diversity-jurisdiction rules in place at the time, 
plaintiffs had little trouble crafting their lawsuits in ways that precluded 
their removal to federal court.48  The end result, according to the critics 
and some judges, was that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers were free to 
shop across the country for the anomalous forum that would certify the 
class or approve an unfair settlement.49 
Rather than attempt to regulate state-court class action practices 
directly,50 Congress chose to address the problem indirectly.  It took 
                                                     
 44. Id. § 2(a)(4). 
 45. See Erichson, supra note 11, at 1596–1602 (cataloguing how class action lawyers were 
described by members of Congress and portrayed in the media). 
 46. Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b)(2). 
 47. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985); Burbank, supra note 10, at 
1521 (characterizing this combination as creating “exorbitant assertions of state court adjudicatory 
authority”). 
 48. Burbank, supra note 10, at 1450–52 (discussing how the amount-in-controversy 
requirement and the plaintiff’s ability to select a nondiverse class member as a named plaintiff 
served as obstacles to diversity-based removal); Marcus, supra note 39, at 1770–76 (discussing the 
pre-CAFA jurisdictional framework and concluding that “there is little to favor the pre-CAFA 
jurisdictional treatment of class actions except that it was already there”). 
 49. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . In 
State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 155, 167 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. 
Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–56, 1660–66 (2008).  
Moreover, failure in one forum was not fatal because, as Judge Easterbrook vividly put it, the class 
lawyers could try again in other states and “[a] single positive trumps all the negatives.”  In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 50. For example, Congress could have addressed the choice-of-law problem by adopting a 
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national state-law cases away from the state courts and put them in the 
hands of federal judges who presumably would be less likely to allow 
abuse.51  As a side benefit, putting these cases in the hands of federal 
judges would give Congress a much clearer path to legislatively address 
class action abuse in the event abusive practices persisted or developed 
in federal court.52 
In its design, CAFA is crafted to cast a remarkably wide net.  CAFA 
starts by extending jurisdiction to all class actions in which there is 
minimal diversity, an aggregate amount in controversy of $5 million, and 
at least 100 class members.53  Any multistate class action would 
necessarily meet the first criteria.  And I think it is fair to conclude that 
the vast majority of multistate class actions would meet the last two 
criteria.54  While CAFA jurisdiction is concurrent with state-court 
jurisdiction—i.e., plaintiffs may still choose to file qualifying suits in 
state court—CAFA contains generous removal provisions to ensure that 
the federal courthouse doors are wide open for qualifying suits originally 
filed in state court.  In particular, CAFA’s removal provisions identify 
                                                                                                                       
national rule for choice of law in national class actions.  See Silberman, supra note 32, at 2005.  
Also, Congress could have addressed the problem of overlapping class actions or repeat efforts at 
certification by amending the Anti-Injunction Act.  Burbank, supra note 10, at 1539. 
 51. Erichson, supra note 11, at 1597 (noting that the principal animating factor was distrust of 
lawyers, but that the jurisdictional shift resulted from the belief that state-court judges could not be 
trusted to monitor and restrain the untrustworthy lawyers); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1416 (2006) (“The congressional 
response was to open up the federal forum as a bulwark against improper or opportunistic state-court 
oversight of the national market.”); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process 
in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2037 (2008) (CAFA reflects 
Congress’s “belief that federal courts will apply different and more restrained standards to the 
administration of class actions than will state courts, thus providing greater confidence that the 
interests of parties on both sides of the dispute will be protected from abuse.”). 
 52. For example, Congress directly regulated federal securities class actions with the enactment 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 and 78u-4 (2006)). 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) (minimal diversity); id. § 1332(d)(5)(B) (100 class 
members); id. § 1332(d)(6) (aggregate amount in controversy).  CAFA also extends jurisdiction to 
so-called “mass actions.”  Id. § 1332(d)(11). 
 54. A 2003 empirical study by the FJC indicated that most class actions have well over 100 
class members.  Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1735.  While that study also found that recoveries 
and settlements frequently are less than $5 million, id. at 1734, the amount in controversy is 
measured ex ante and, at least in original filings, is met if a recovery above the jurisdictional amount 
is possible.  St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (“legal 
certainty” test).  Determining the amount in controversy is a more difficult task in removed cases, 
and the circuit law varies.  Some circuits apply the legal certainty test to removed actions as well.  
McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 954 (10th Cir. 2008).  But other circuits apply tests that 
leave room for plaintiffs to manipulate their claims for relief in a way that might permit them to 
circumvent the jurisdictional amount and thereby frustrate removal.  Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 
F.3d 1184, 1207–15 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the court may consider only the removal papers 
and not extrinsic evidence). 
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the three major obstacles to removal in general diversity-jurisdiction 
cases and make them inapplicable in CAFA cases.55  In sum, CAFA’s 
basic jurisdictional provisions make it very likely that any significant 
multistate class action can be either filed in or removed to federal court. 
Despite casting a wide net generally, CAFA does contain a small set 
of exceptions.  Most important for our purposes are two exceptions 
designed to preserve the role of state courts over class actions that are 
genuinely in-state matters.56  First, CAFA contains an exception 
generally known as the “home state” exception for cases in which the 
principal defendants and two-thirds of the class members are citizens of 
the state in which the action is filed.57  Second, CAFA contains an 
exception generally known as the “local controversy” exception.58  It too 
requires that two-thirds of the class members be citizens of the state in 
which the action is filed, but expands on the “home state” exception by 
conferring jurisdiction if any significant defendant is a citizen of that 
state and the injuries and conduct in question are local to that state.59  
These exceptions have been justly criticized for being uncertain and 
cumbersome structures that require litigants and courts to expend energy 
and resources on identifying the proper forum rather than resolving the 
merits.60  That being said, the most important quality of these carve-outs 
is their limited scope. 
Only a small subset of the claims contained in a truly nationwide 
class action can ever fit within these in-state class action carve-outs.61  
Most critically, CAFA does not allow lawyers to simply break up their 
                                                     
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (stating that CAFA removals are not subject to the one-year cap under 
§ 1446(b), are allowed even if there is a home-state defendant, and do not require the consent of all 
defendants). 
 56. For a discussion of U.S. Judicial Conference policy on CAFA and the policy position that 
class action reform should leave truly in-state class actions in state court, see Lee & Willging, supra 
note 3, at 1725–33 (chronicling the evolution and formation of U.S. Judicial Conference policy on 
expanded federal jurisdiction over multistate class actions). 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
 58. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
 59. Id. (also requiring no other class action on those facts to have been brought against any of 
the defendants during the previous three years).  CAFA also contains a discretionary carve-out with 
a dizzying array of factors in cases where more than one-third but less than two-thirds of the class 
members are citizens of the state where the case is filed.  See id. § 1332(d)(3). 
 60. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1554–58 (2008) (describing carve-outs for in-state class actions as 
“bewilderingly complicated” and asserting that CAFA has already generated a great deal of socially 
wasteful litigation over its scope and application). 
 61. Jay Tidmarsh, Finding Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA World: The Case of 
the Counterclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 195 (2007) (“Although CAFA was crafted 
to keep small and predominantly local state-law class actions in state court, few class actions can 
take advantage of these limitations.”). 
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national class actions into state-by-state class actions to be litigated in 
state court.  The “home state” and the “local controversy” exceptions 
apply only when a largely or predominantly in-state class sues an in-state 
defendant. 
Consider the fate of a national class action like Ysbrand v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp.62 under the CAFA scheme.  With class members 
from all over the country and tens of millions of dollars of claimed 
damages, it would clearly qualify for CAFA jurisdiction.63  Moreover, 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers could not circumvent CAFA simply by breaking it 
up into fifty separate class actions, one brought in each state by a class of 
citizens of that state.  It is true that a “Michigan” class suing in Michigan 
would fall within the in-state carve-outs because the class members and 
the defendant would be citizens of the filing state.  But any other state-
based class—e.g., an “Oklahoma” class in Oklahoma or a “California” 
class in California—would fall outside the CAFA exceptions because 
DaimlerChrysler is not a citizen of those states.  Thus, while CAFA 
preserves state-court jurisdiction when a defendant is sued in its own 
state by a local class, it opens up federal-court jurisdiction any time the 
defendant is sued in other states or by classes of citizens of other states.64 
Despite the breadth of its jurisdictional coverage, CAFA still has one 
big hole.  Like general diversity jurisdiction, CAFA jurisdiction is 
concurrent with state-court jurisdiction and not exclusive of it.  In other 
words, it permits original filing and removal but requires neither.  The 
significance of not closing off access to the state courts is that the named 
plaintiffs and the defendants can still take advantage of state courts that 
will approve abusive settlements.65  How?  That’s easy.  If the plaintiff 
files a nationwide class action in the desired state and the defendant 
foregoes removal, then the state-court judge will be the one to determine 
certification and approve any class-wide settlement.  A provision that 
would have granted a removal option to absent class members would  
 
                                                     
 62. 81 P.3d 618, 625–26 (Okla. 2003). 
 63. See id. at 622. 
 64. Professor Burbank specifically criticized Congress for failing to preserve a state-court 
forum for “a class action brought on behalf solely of the citizens of that state, alleging injuries 
sustained in the state as a result of the in-state activities of an out-of-state corporation doing 
substantial business in the state.”  Burbank, supra note 10, at 1527–28.  See also Burbank, supra 
note 41, at 12 (“At the end of the day, CAFA’s exceedingly narrow exceptions are revealed as 
another depressing example of legislative overreaching by those who invoke the virtues of 
federalism when it is convenient to do so.”). 
 65. Burbank, supra note 10, at 1519; Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 49, at 1666–67; 
Wolff, supra note 51, at 2039–43. 
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have offered them some protection against collusive deals, but it was 
dropped.66 
In summary, the structure of CAFA yields three general governing 
jurisdictional principles: 
(1) Virtually all of the nationwide class actions previously filed in state 
court now can be originally filed in or removed to federal court. 
(2) CAFA’s carve-outs for in-state class actions are very narrow and 
are effectively limited to situations where an in-state class sues an in-
state defendant. 
(3) Because CAFA jurisdiction is concurrent with state-court 
jurisdiction, plaintiffs still can file their nationwide class actions in state 
court, and nothing in CAFA obligates defendants to remove those cases 
to federal court. 
Using the principles identified above as a guide, the following 
questions emerge about the impact of CAFA on Oklahoma state-court 
class action practice: 
(1) Has CAFA affected the number of class action filings in Oklahoma? 
(2) Has CAFA affected the number of removals from Oklahoma state 
court to federal court? 
(3) As to the cases filed in Oklahoma state court and not removed, were 
they cases that fell outside CAFA jurisdiction or were they cases that 
the plaintiffs chose to file in state court and that the defendants chose 
not to remove? 
(4) If there are cases that could have been filed in or removed to federal 
court but were not, does anything suggest whether they were left in 
Oklahoma state court for the purpose of obtaining the types of allegedly 
abusive certifications and settlement approvals that Congress said 
CAFA was intended to prevent? 
Using the data collected in my empirical study, I can present interim 
findings on the first and second questions.  While the available data 
allow for some speculation about the third and fourth questions, 
definitive findings will have to await the collection of additional data. 
                                                     
 66. Wolff, supra note 51, at 2043. 
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III. THE CAFA EFFECT IN OKLAHOMA 
In order to test the hypothesis that CAFA was moving national state-
law class actions from the state courts to federal court, I conducted an 
empirical study of class action activity in cases filed in Oklahoma state 
court from 2001 through 2008.  As part of that process, I collected data 
on a range of issues including filings, removal, certification requests, and 
outcomes of certified cases.  Subpart A describes the methodology I 
used.  Subpart B presents my findings on filings and removal.  Subpart C 
presents interim findings on the frequency and outcomes of certification 
requests and on the fate of certified cases. 
A. Research Design and Methodology 
The purpose of this empirical study was twofold.  One purpose was 
to collect filing data that would parallel Phase One of the FJC’s study.67  
These data would facilitate analysis of whether CAFA was shifting class 
actions from state court to federal court.  Another purpose, though, was 
to collect data on class action practice in Oklahoma generally, similar to 
Phase Two of the FJC’s study of federal-court class actions.68  These data 
would provide a first peek into what was happening in class actions that 
were being litigated in Oklahoma state courts.69  I initially used a study 
period of January 2001 through June 2008.  I later updated the study 
period to extend through December 2008.  The final data set contains 
cases filed from 2001 through 2008. 
The first step in the study was to identify the population of cases in 
which there was any class action activity.  Because one of the purposes 
of the study was to provide companion data to the FJC’s study of federal-
court class actions, I sought to replicate its process to the extent possible.  
                                                     
 67. Phase One of the FJC’s study collected filing and removal data.  EMERY G. LEE III & 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 1 
(2008), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa1108.pdf/$file/cafa1108.pdf. 
 68. Phase Two of the FJC’s study will attempt to measure CAFA’s impact, if any, on the 
litigation activity and judicial rulings in federal-court class actions.  Id. at 1. 
 69. I am aware of no other similar study of class action practice in Oklahoma.  The only 
empirical analysis of Oklahoma class actions that I know of, to date, is found in a study addressing 
tort reform in Oklahoma.  See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of “Tort Reform” on Tort Case 
Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 582–85 (2009).  Given the more general nature of that study, 
however, the data is rather limited; it reaches only the thirteen counties that maintain electronic 
dockets on the state’s OCIS system, and it reports only whether a case was classified on the docket 
as a class action.  Id. at 583.  Analysis of the docket sheets to confirm whether the case actually 
involved class action activity and to determine the outcome was limited to one county.  Id. 
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The FJC’s study is a docket study of cases filed during the study 
period.70  To identify its population, the FJC did three things: (1) it 
conducted an electronic search of the federal docket sheets to identify 
possible class actions; (2) it then conducted a visual review of the docket 
sheets identified to eliminate false positives; and, finally, (3) it cross-
checked those results against other resources that might identify class 
action cases.71  For this study, I used the same techniques, adapted to fit 
the different resources available to me. 
To identify the population of class action cases, my research team 
conducted term searches of the two electronic databases that serve the 
Oklahoma state courts.  Thirteen Oklahoma counties, including all of the 
counties containing Oklahoma’s largest metropolitan areas, maintain 
real-time court-docket information on the Oklahoma Court Information 
System (OCIS), hosted on the Oklahoma State Courts Network.72  We 
searched the docket sheets electronically for the following terms: 
“2023”; “class action”; “class certification”; “certify”; and “class” within 
200 words of “settlement.”  We then inspected the docket sheet for each 
case to identify those cases with class action activity and to eliminate 
false positives.73 
The other sixty-four counties in Oklahoma—mostly the smaller, 
rural counties—do not keep real-time dockets on the OCIS.  Rather, they 
utilize a private company, Kellpro, Inc., to provide computerized docket 
services.74  That system is called the On Demand Court Records (ODCR) 
system.75  While we could not obtain direct access to the ODCR system, 
we arranged for Kellpro staff to electronically search the docket sheets 
and case codes for all civil actions using the terms “2023” and “class 
action.”  Kellpro staff also searched the docket entries, which ODCR 
lists as string entries, for any string that contained the term “class” and 
any one of the following: “action”; “certify”; “certification”; or 
                                                     
 70. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 67, at 3. 
 71. Id. at 17. 
 72. See Dockets of Oklahoma Courts, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/start.asp 
?viewType=DOCKETS (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) (describing scope and content of the OCIS 
system). 
 73. Unlike the FJC’s study, we did not eliminate “duplicative” class actions.  Lee & Willging, 
supra note 3, at 1746.  In our data, situations in which the same class action was filed by multiple 
parties in the same county, or in which arguably the same class action was filed by the same or 
multiple parties in different counties, were isolated and rare.  In those few situations where it 
occurred, I elected to count each case as filed. 
 74. See Kellpro Products and Services, http://kellpro.com/products/kcs/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2010) (listing Kellpro’s Court System services). 
 75. See On Demand Court Records, http://www.odcr.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2010) (entry 
portal to the ODCR system). 
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“settlement.”76  Kellpro’s search excluded civil actions that were coded 
FD (Family and Domestic), JFP (Paternity), and PO (Protective Order).  
As with the OCIS search results, the research team then inspected the 
docket sheet for each case to identify those cases with class action 
activity.  We then combined the data sets derived from the OCIS and the 
ODCR systems. 
As a cross-check, we searched Westlaw’s “Oklahoma Cases” 
database for all published cases that involved class action activity.  We 
also searched the electronic database of unpublished Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals decisions hosted by the Oklahoma Attorney General’s 
Office.77  We then cross-checked the OCIS and ODCR search results 
against these databases. 
The process we used should have identified a very high percentage 
of the cases with class action activity, though I cannot say how great that 
percentage is.78  In particular, the process is likely to have identified 
nearly every case in which class action activity proceeded beyond an 
initial designation of a case as a class action or beyond the assertion of 
class allegations in the complaint.  In other words, it seems unlikely that 
the process will have missed many cases in which a party actually sought 
certification, and even less likely that it would have missed cases in 
which the court resolved the dispute on a class-wide basis.79 
                                                     
 76. Technical differences between the functionality of the OCIS docket sheets and the ODCR 
system required us to vary the search process and search terms slightly, though—we believe—in a 
way that may have increased false positives rather than false negatives in the ODCR data set.  In 
other words, because we could not perfectly reproduce the OCIS search process on the ODCR 
system, we selected alternatives that we believed would be over-inclusive, relying on visual 
inspection to eliminate the larger number of false positives. 
 77. Oklahoma Public Research System, Attorney General Opinions Search, http://oklegal. 
onenet.net/agopinions.basic.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 78. See Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1745.  We did not replicate the FJC’s process exactly.  
As discussed above, technical limitations of the OCIS and the ODCR system required that we 
modify the search process.  In addition, unlike the FJC, we did not search for the term “class” by 
itself.  Early testing of the search process revealed that it would have produced an unreasonable 
amount of false positives that, given the system limitations, we could not otherwise limit or control 
for and that we could not feasibly eliminate by individual case review.  But early testing also failed 
to indicate that the search terms we did use were generating false negatives.  Accordingly, I chose 
not to search for the term “class” by itself.  That being said, that decision necessarily increases the 
chance that the study failed to locate some cases with a minimal but qualifying amount of class 
action activity. 
 79. In most of the cases where the court certified a class action and then approved a class-wide 
resolution, the docket sheet virtually lit up with search term hits.  That being said, we did find a 
nonnegligible number of very short docket sheets with just a few search-term hits in cases where (1) 
the parties quickly sought certification and approval of a class-wide settlement, (2) nobody contested 
any aspect of certification or settlement approval, and (3) the judge conducted minimal certification 
or approval proceedings.  In those circumstances, it is possible that the court could certify a class and 
approve a class-wide settlement and yet generate a docket with docket entries so few, so brief, or so 
nondescriptive that they do not contain any of our search terms. 
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The data we collected do differ from the FJC’s Phase One data in 
one material respect.  The FJC was able to code its cases by nature-of-
suit (e.g., contracts, torts, “other fraud”) based on the civil cover-sheet 
information provided by the plaintiff’s attorney at the time of filing.  
That type of information was not directly available from the electronic 
docket sheets kept on OCIS or the ODCR system.  While it is possible to 
determine nature-of-suit information from the petitions (complaints) filed 
in state court, the petitions are only sometimes available electronically on 
OCIS and are never available electronically on the ODCR system.  We 
did not undertake to obtain hard copies of the petitions in all of the class 
action filings from all of the seventy-seven Oklahoma counties.  
Accordingly, I can only present aggregate filings data and cannot present 
data on nature-of-suit trends. 
B. Filings and Removals 
This section presents findings on the core question of this study—
whether class action filings in Oklahoma state court dropped after CAFA 
took effect.  Figure 1 presents a bar graph of all class action filings in the 
Oklahoma state courts during the eight-year study period from 2001 
through 2008.  Class action filings were at their highest level in 2002 and 
2004, with fifty-eight and fifty-five filings respectively.  Class action 
filings were at their lowest level in 2006 and 2008, with twenty-three and 
twenty-six filings respectively.  CAFA took effect on February 18, 2005.  
Thus, the two highest years in the study preceded CAFA, the two lowest 
years in the study came after CAFA, and the drop-off from the highest 
years to the lowest years was over fifty percent. 
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Class action filings did experience a spike of fifty filings in 2007.  
Further analysis showed that thirty-two of those cases were filed in 
Oklahoma County.  Of those, twenty-eight were “unwanted fax” cases.80  
These cases certainly deserve to be counted; they were validly filed and 
some of them resulted in substantial recoveries for the class.  
Nonetheless, the spike in filings traces to a specific and nonrecurring 
influx of filings—nearly all of them filed in clusters by the same lawyer 
for the same named plaintiffs—rather than a general surge in class action 
activity. 
Figure 2 presents the same Oklahoma state-court filing data but 
breaks it out into six-month periods.  The six-month data more clearly 
locate the timing of the drop-off in class action activity.  Up to and 
including the first half of 2005 (which includes CAFA’s effective date), 
class action filings averaged just under twenty-five per six-month period, 
with a median of twenty-three.  Beginning with the second half of 2005, 
class action filings averaged sixteen per six-month period, with a median 
of thirteen.  Thus, average filings dropped by 36%, and the median 
dropped by 43%.  If we disregard the first half of 2007 (which 
experienced the “unwanted fax” case spike), class action filings post-
                                                     
 80. Congress provides a private right of action for the receipt of unsolicited facsimile 
advertisements.  Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2005), amended by 
Junk Fax Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005).  Though the cause of action is 
federal, jurisdiction lies in the state courts, “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a 
State.”  Id. 
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CAFA averaged thirteen per six-month period, with the median 
remaining at thirteen.  That would translate to a 48% drop in the average 
filing rate and a 43% drop in the median filing rate. 
 
We can also see the impact of CAFA by looking more closely at the 
data from the first six months of 2005, when CAFA took effect.  Table 1, 
below, shows class action filings during the full six-month period broken 
down into three periods: (1) pre-CAFA; (2) on February 18, the effective 
date of CAFA; and (3) post-CAFA.  During the first forty-eight days of 
2005 prior to CAFA’s effective date, twelve class actions were filed.81  
During the 132 days after CAFA’s effective date, ten class actions were 
filed.  Put another way, in the days leading up to CAFA, lawyers were 
filing class actions in Oklahoma at the rate of one every four days.  Once 
CAFA took effect, the filing rate dropped to one every thirteen days.  
That figure is consistent with filing rates in the subsequent six-month 
periods.  Using the median filing rate per six-month period (thirteen), 
lawyers were filing class actions in Oklahoma at the rate of one every 
fourteen days. 
                                                     
 81. I have excluded the three class actions filed on February 18, 2005, because it is not clear to 
me whether to include them as pre-CAFA or post-CAFA cases.  Though they are technically post-
CAFA, the data from Table 2 and my instincts persuade me that they most likely were botched 
attempts to beat CAFA’s effective date.  At any rate, even if we include those cases in the “post-
CAFA” figures, the filing rate still drops to one every ten days. 
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Table 1: Oklahoma State-Court Class action Filings 
January 1 – June 30, 2005 
Period n 
January 1 – February 17 12 
February 18 
(CAFA Effective Date) 3 
February 19 – June 30 10 
 
Table 2 takes an even closer view and shows class action filings by 
date during the month of February 2005.  Together, Tables 1 and 2 seem 
to show a surge in class action filings leading up to CAFA’s effective 
date, particularly if one views the cases filed on February 18 as 
miscalculated or belated attempts to file pre-CAFA. 
Table 2: Oklahoma State-Court Class action Filings 
February 2005 Filing Dates 
Filing Date n 
February 7 1 
February 9 3 
February 14 1 
February 16 4 
February 17 1 
February 18 
(CAFA Effective Date) 3 
February 24 1 
 
These findings, so far, show rather clearly that class action filings in 
Oklahoma fell significantly after CAFA took effect.  Standing alone, 
however, the drop in class action filings in Oklahoma does not prove the 
hypothesis being tested—namely, it does not prove that CAFA caused a 
shift of class action filings from state court to federal court.  To know 
that, we must return to the federal-court data to see if there was a 
corresponding increase in federal-court filings. 
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Figure 3 presents data on federal-court class action filings and 
removals in the federal districts in Oklahoma from July 2001 through 
June 2007.82  If the hypothesis of a direct CAFA shift from Oklahoma 
state court to the Oklahoma federal courts were true, we should expect to 
see a significant rise in the number of class actions filed in the Oklahoma 
federal courts post-CAFA.  In fact, we find quite the opposite.  Starting  
 
with the six-month period that includes CAFA’s effective date, class 
action filings and removals in the Oklahoma federal courts experienced a 
steep decline. 
Moreover, the decline was mostly attributable to a drop in original 
filings.  Figure 4 provides a line graph showing original filings, 
removals, and remands in the Oklahoma federal districts from July 2001 
through June 2007.  Removal activity was always modest during this 
period, never exceeding twelve during any six-month period.  Beginning 
with the six-month period starting July 1, 2005, it has been minimal, 
                                                     
 82. Credit for this data goes to the FJC, which graciously provided me with access to its 
national data set so that I could compile filings data from the Oklahoma federal districts.  Note that 
the FJC’s study period concluded after June 2007.  Thus, I do not have federal data to compare with 
the last three six-month periods of Oklahoma filing data. 
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never exceeding three during any six-month period.  What the line graph 
does show is that (1) there were two spikes in original filings with the 
most recent in the latter half of 2004 and (2) post-CAFA there was a 
decrease in both the number of original filings and the number of 
removals. 
 
To complete the picture, Figure 5 presents a bar graph showing the 
total number of Oklahoma federal-court and Oklahoma state-court class 
actions filed during the respective study periods.83  If, say, CAFA were 
simply shifting state-law class actions from the courts of State X to the 
federal courts located in State X, we would expect to see the total number 
of filings remain fairly constant; the difference would be a shift in where 
they were filed and/or an increase in the number of removals.  Instead, 
with the exception of the first half of 2007, there appears to have been an 
across-the-board reduction in the number of class actions filed in 
Oklahoma.  Thus, these data provide no support for the hypothesis that 
CAFA would shift class action activity from the state courts to the 
federal courts located in those states. 
                                                     
 83. In this chart we counted only original filings to ensure that removed cases were not double-
counted.  However, the chart does indicate the number of cases that were removed and not remanded 
in order to show what portion of the state-filed cases were ultimately resolved in federal court. 
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If we accept the premise that class action filings in Oklahoma at both 
the state and federal level have fallen since CAFA, what might explain 
that result?  One possibility, of course, is that lawyers are simply filing 
fewer class actions.  That is a very real possibility.  Professor Erichson 
has greatly enriched our understanding of aggregate litigation by 
showing how lawyers have found nonclass means of litigating and 
settling mass disputes on a collective basis.84  In their contribution to this 
symposium, Tom Willging and Emery Lee present empirical support for 
the conclusion that lawyers are increasingly using nonclass settlements to 
resolve mass-tort litigation.85  Another possibility is that the reduction in 
state-court class action filings will prove to be temporary.  There is much 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that plaintiffs’ lawyers made anticipatory 
filings pre-CAFA in order to avoid its jurisdictional impact.  At a limited 
level, the data in Tables 1 and 2 above support the notion that there was 
at least a mini-rush to file in advance of CAFA.  My own discussions 
with plaintiffs’ class action lawyers in Oklahoma tend to support that 
idea as well.  In response to questions about whether CAFA has 
impacted their practices, more than one lawyer told me that CAFA had 
not yet been an issue for them because they were still “working off the 
inventory.” 
                                                     
 84. Erichson, supra note 11, at 1625. 
 85. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 787–89, 793–
802 (2010). 
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Another possible reason for the drop in class action activity in 
Oklahoma is that national class actions are still being filed, but in places 
other than Oklahoma.  If that is the case, where are they being filed?  The 
following paragraphs consider two possibilities: (1) that they are being 
filed in federal courts in places other than Oklahoma and (2) that they are 
being filed in other states. 
 
There is intriguing evidence to suggest that the horizontal forum 
shopping that used to take place on a state-to-state basis is now taking 
place on a federal-court-to-federal-court basis.  Figure 6 is a chart 
prepared by the FJC.86  As the chart shows, class action activity based on 
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction increased post-CAFA in every 
circuit.  Those data are consistent with the hypothesis that CAFA would 
shift dockets from the state courts to the federal courts.  However, the 
size of the increase varied greatly across the circuits.87  Certain circuits—
                                                     
 86. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS 
ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 18 (2007) http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/cafa0407.pdf/$file/cafa0407.pdf; see also Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1759 (chart reproduced 
and analyzed therein). 
 87. These variations existed at the district court level as well.  LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, 
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especially the Ninth, but also the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh—
experienced dramatic increases in diversity class action filings after 
CAFA took effect.  Other circuits—e.g., the Tenth Circuit—had much 
smaller increases.  Moreover, most of the increase in the Tenth Circuit 
was attributable to removals rather than original filings.88 
If plaintiffs are in fact “shopping the circuits,” we ought not be 
surprised.89  By definition, national class actions reach across the 
country.  The same liberal due-process standards that support personal 
jurisdiction in states across the country also support personal jurisdiction 
in federal districts across the country.90  Moreover, in the case of a 
defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in every state, venue 
conceivably could be available in every district in the country as well.91  
Thus, a plaintiff choosing to file a national class action in federal court 
under CAFA is likely to have her choice of federal districts in which to 
file.  Of course, the fact that CAFA jurisdiction is concurrent with state-
court jurisdiction means that plaintiffs remain free to forum shop the 
states.  But savvy plaintiffs will recognize that defendants that are sued 
in a plaintiff-friendly state court will be sure to remove, and removal will 
be to the federal district in which the state court where the case was filed 
sits.92  Thus, it would be perfectly logical for savvy plaintiffs to file in 
federal court in the first place so that they at least can control the choice 
of federal forum. 
So, one way of reading the Oklahoma state-court and Oklahoma 
federal-court data is as a sign that plaintiff’s lawyers with national class 
actions do not think that filing anywhere in Oklahoma offers the best 
prospects for success.  At least until the November 1, 2009, class action 
reforms took effect, Oklahoma was viewed as having certification 
friendly class action standards.93  But a plaintiff filing a contested94 
national class action in Oklahoma state court could fairly predict a quick 
removal to federal court under CAFA, with class certification then being 
                                                                                                                       
at 9–10. 
 88. Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1761. 
 89. Erichson, supra note 11, at 1612–14; Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1761–62 (but noting 
that not all of the data supports the federal forum-shopping hypothesis). 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (generally aligning personal jurisdiction in federal court with 
personal jurisdiction in the state in which the federal court sits). 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2006) (venue lies in any district in which the defendant is subject to 
personal jurisdiction). 
 92. Id. § 1441(a). 
 93. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text. 
 94. Plaintiffs’ lawyers filing uncontested class actions—i.e., those in which the defendant has 
already agreed to a settlement—present much different forum-shopping dynamics and are discussed 
infra.  See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
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subject to Tenth Circuit standards.  So if Tenth Circuit class action 
practices are less advantageous to plaintiffs than those in other circuits, it 
would be perfectly rational for lawyers to bypass both the Oklahoma 
state courts and the Oklahoma federal courts.  While I have not 
attempted to analyze the case law to determine where the Tenth Circuit 
might fall on a hierarchy of attractiveness to class action plaintiffs (and 
their lawyers), post-CAFA removal data supply an intriguing surrogate.  
Whereas original filings in the Tenth Circuit increased only slightly post-
CAFA, removals increased by nearly 200%.95  In contrast, several 
circuits often associated with more lenient certification practices—e.g., 
the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit—saw a much larger post-
CAFA increase in original filings compared to removals.96  The fact that, 
compared to other circuits, the Tenth Circuit was much more attractive to 
defendants than to plaintiffs certainly supports the inference that Tenth 
Circuit class action practices favor defendants. 
While the general idea that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers would 
shop the circuits in terms of original filing makes a great deal of sense to 
me, the idea that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers would flee from 
Oklahoma is puzzling to me in one aspect.  Absent some overriding 
directive, a federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law 
rules of the state in which it sits.97  As noted earlier, Oklahoma has 
interpreted its version of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as 
choosing the law of a single state—that of the defendant manufacturer—
to govern the claims of all class members in a national warranty class 
action.98  CAFA did not explicitly alter the choice-of-law rules governing 
state-law class actions.99  Thus, a federal court located in Oklahoma 
would still apply Oklahoma’s choice-of-law scheme to a national state-
law class action originally filed in Oklahoma.  Given the critical impact 
that choice of law has on predominance under Federal Rule 23(b)(3),100 
                                                     
 95. See Lee & Willging, supra note 3, at 1760 fig.7. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 98. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 625–26 (Okla. 2003). 
 99. Silberman, supra note 32, at 2025.  Some have argued that CAFA empowers federal judges 
to craft a federal common-law choice-of-law rule in CAFA cases.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, 
Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness 
Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1869 (2006) (arguing that federal judges need not follow state 
choice-of-law rules in CAFA cases and should adopt a default rule of applying the law of the 
defendant’s home state in cases involving national conduct).  As of this writing, I am not aware of 
any federal cases that have taken that path. 
 100. See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES AND 
COMMENTARY 366–67 (2009) (discussing role of choice of law in class certification); see also Linda 
J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54, 57–59 (2009) (same). 
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the availability of Oklahoma choice of law would, to me, make the 
Oklahoma federal courts attractive to national warranty cases even if 
Tenth Circuit certification standards might be considered more 
demanding in general.  That being said, I have no reason to believe that 
the national plaintiffs’ class action bar has not factored that into the 
forum-selection equation already, and they do appear to be voting “not 
Oklahoma” with their feet. 
At this point, we cannot rule out a different explanation for the drop 
in class action activity in Oklahoma—that a portion of Oklahoma’s class 
action docket has shifted to other state courts.  On the surface, this may 
seem like an odd premise.  After all, the whole point of CAFA was to 
counteract state-level forum shopping by opening up the federal 
courthouse doors, particularly for defendants wishing to remove.  Yet 
while CAFA greatly undermined much of the incentive structure for 
state-level forum shopping, it did not make state-to-state differences 
wholly irrelevant, nor did it remove all incentive for filing in state court 
originally. 
First, CAFA does not eliminate the incentive to file even contested 
national class actions in state courts when the state-court and the federal-
court class action practices are equally favorable.  In that case, the 
defendant would have less (or no) incentive to remove, and the plaintiff 
would be happy with either the state forum or the federal forum in the 
event of removal.  If such a state existed and if there were plaintiffs still 
wishing to proceed in a state forum, one might expect such plaintiffs to 
file their national state-law class actions in that state. 
Does such a state exist?  Though I have not attempted to try to 
identify state-federal court pairings that might meet those criteria, 
California may warrant a look in that regard.  At the federal level, class 
action activity in the districts in the Ninth Circuit surged.  Original 
filings increased by nearly 400%, while removals increased by over 
100%.101  In the Central District of California, original filings increased 
nearly 500%.102  But class action filings in the California state courts 
more or less held steady during that period.103  These data certainly 
suggest that class action plaintiffs are forum shopping the federal courts 
and liking what they see in the Ninth Circuit and the federal districts in 
California.  But it also appears that class action plaintiffs continue to like 
                                                     
 101. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 102. Id. at 9. 
 103. See HEHMAN, supra note 12, at 3–4.  While class action filings dropped from 833 in 2004 
to 751 in 2005, the 2005 filing rate was still the second highest in the study period, consistent with a 
six-year trend of annual twelve percent growth.  Id. 
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what they see in California state court as well.  In its study, the California 
OCR has collected data on the size of the class and the class definition.104  
Perhaps that data will shed light on (1) whether plaintiffs are filing 
national class actions in California state court post-CAFA and (2) 
whether any of those cases are being left in state court by virtue of the 
defendants foregoing removal. 
Second, state-court class action practices also continue to matter very 
much in cases where the class lawyers and the defendant have reached a 
settlement and are looking for a state court that will certify the settlement 
class and approve the settlement.  In this type of scenario, the class 
action practices of the federal circuit are irrelevant since neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant intend to invoke federal jurisdiction.105  From 
this perspective, though, there is little to account for the drop in 
Oklahoma state-court filings during the study period.106  As the 
certification and resulting coupon settlement in Grider v. Compaq show, 
Oklahoma judges have signed off on class settlements that might raise 
eyebrows or be subject to restrictions elsewhere.107  I will return to this 
topic later in the discussion of the data on filing rates of litigation classes 
versus filing rates of settlement classes. 
Finally, the drop in Oklahoma state-court filings may simply be the 
natural byproduct of the narrowness of CAFA’s carve-outs.  As 
discussed earlier, both of CAFA’s mandatory carve-outs require a 
predominantly in-state class and the presence of a qualifying in-state 
defendant.108  Speaking generally, the only time defendants are barred 
from removing is when they are sued in their home states by a class of 
home-state citizens.  When a defendant is not a citizen of the state in 
which the suit is filed, it will be able to remove even if every class 
member is from that state and all of the relevant activity occurred in that 
state.  The bottom line is that the CAFA in-state carve-outs require local 
plaintiffs and local defendants.  Viewed pragmatically, CAFA links the 
size of a state’s docket of nonremovable class actions to the size of that 
                                                     
 104. Id. at 1. 
 105. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 106. It remains to be seen how the recent Oklahoma class action reforms will impact 
certification and settlement approval practices in the Oklahoma state courts. 
 107. Under CAFA, for example, percentage-of-fund attorney’s fees must be based on the value 
of coupons redeemed rather than the face value.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006).  In Texas—and 
now in Oklahoma—lawyers who secure class compensation in the form of coupons or other 
discounts are to be paid in kind.  TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i)(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2023(G)(4)(f). 
 108. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.  The term “qualifying” in-state defendant 
means either a “significant” defendant under § 1332(d)(4)(A) or a “primary” defendant under 
§ 1332(d)(4)(B).  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa), 1332(d)(4)(B) (2006). 
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state’s corporate base.  In order to bring a viable in-state class action, you 
need a local defendant worth suing on a class-wide basis. 
If that premise is true, we would expect in-state class action activity 
to remain the strongest in the large states with large numbers of corporate 
defendants and to decrease in the smaller states with fewer class action 
targets.  Here too, a comparison of the post-CAFA experiences of 
California and Oklahoma may be telling.  As detailed earlier, California 
is the largest state in the union and has one of the largest economies in 
the nation.109  It is also home to ninety-eight of the Fortune 1000 
companies.110  In contrast, Oklahoma is a much smaller state with a much 
smaller economy.111  Moreover, it is home to just six of the Fortune 1000 
companies and zero that rank in the top 100.112  Is it really any surprise 
that post-CAFA class action activity remains strong in California but is 
in decline in Oklahoma? 
Viewed from this angle, the future of state-court class actions starts 
to look like a demographics and math problem.  Post-CAFA, what 
contested class actions would make economic sense to bring in 
Oklahoma state court?  There are relatively few large local corporate 
targets.  And while the class size could conceivably run into the millions, 
it necessarily would have to exclude ninety-eight percent of the U.S. 
population.  Some types of Oklahoma state-court class actions will 
continue to make economic sense.  In particular, I would expect lawyers 
to continue to file oil-and-gas royalty class actions in Oklahoma against 
in-state energy companies.  But in California and other states with either 
large populations or large corporate bases, it seems likely that a much 
wider range of state-court class actions will continue to make economic 
sense.113 
                                                     
 109. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 110. Fortune 500 2009: States: California Companies, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune500/2009/states/CA.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 111. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 112. Fortune 500 2009: States: Oklahoma Companies, http://money.cnn.com/magazines 
/fortune/fortune500/2009/states/OK.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 113. I do not want to overstate this hypothesis.  Many factors will influence the robustness of in-
state class action practice, including the availability of state-specific causes of action.  For example, 
the OCR study notes an increase in the number of class actions brought in California under 
California’s labor code and consumer-protection laws.  See HEHMAN, supra note 12, at 7–10.  That 
being said, the size of a state’s workforce and the number of large defendants will still have an 
impact on the number of viable class actions that might be brought under those laws. 
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C. Certification and Outcomes of Certified Cases 
In this section of the Article, I present preliminary findings on 
certification rates in Oklahoma state court and the outcomes of certified 
cases.  The data here are necessarily interim data as many of the cases 
are still pending and many of them have pending motions for 
certification or settlement approval.114 
Table 3 presents data on the frequency of certification motions in 
cases identified as having any class action activity.  Overall, certification 
motions were filed in fewer than 45% of those cases.  If only pre-CAFA 
cases are considered, however, the number rises to slightly more than 
52%, compared to approximately 33% in the post-CAFA cases.  At this 
point, it is not possible to tell whether this difference will persist or 
whether the post-CAFA figure will rise as more certification motions are 
filed in those more recently filed cases. 
Table 3: Frequency of Motions to Certify 






Sought 110 (52.4%) 41 (32.8%) 151 (44.8%) 
 
The fact that motions to certify were filed in only about half of the 
Oklahoma class action filings in our study should not come as a surprise.  
In their contribution to this symposium, Willging and Lee analyze data 
regarding the frequency of class certification motions from four different 
studies.115  These studies found certification motion rates of 24%, 43%, 
51%, and 70%.116  Because these studies were conducted at different 
times using different populations and different methods, the fact that they 
resulted in a rather wide range of percentages is less important than the 
more general finding that, in a substantial portion of cases with class 
                                                     
 114. There are two relevant screening dates for this data.  In April 2009, we screened the full 
data set to identify the cases in which motions to certify had been filed.  At the same time, we coded 
the cases to determine the outcomes of those motions and to identify the case outcomes in cases 
where class certification was granted.  In October 2009, we revisited the population of cases where a 
motion to certify was filed in order to update the data on the outcomes of those motions and case 
outcomes.  We did not rescreen the full data set to determine whether any new motions to certify had 
been filed during the period between April and October 2009.  Thus, the findings presented here set 
forth data current through October 2009 on the cases in which a motion to certify had been filed as 
of April 2009. 
 115. Willging & Lee, supra note 85, at 787–88. 
 116. Id. at 789. 
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allegations, no motion to certify the alleged class is ever filed.117  Most 
recently, the Second Interim Report from the California OCR study 
found that there was no certification activity in 73% of the cases filed as 
class actions.118  Some of the lack of certification activity likely is 
attributable to the rigorous case management practices employed as part 
of California’s Complex Civil Litigation Program.119  Nonetheless, the 
California data mirrors the federal data and the Oklahoma data in 
showing “a significant gap between cases that are simply filed as class 
actions and those that are ultimately litigated as class actions.”120 
In those cases where certification is sought, the plaintiffs look to be 
doing fairly well.  Table 4 presents data on the fate of cases after the 
plaintiff moves for certification.  By far the most common outcome in 
Oklahoma was that certification would be granted.  For all cases in this 
study where certification was sought, the court granted certification 
approximately 53% of the time.  In pre-CAFA cases, the percentage was 
over 58%.121  In comparison, denials of certification were relatively 
uncommon.  Overall, the court denied certification in just seventeen 
cases (11%).  To put this in perspective, it was more likely that the 
plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss for reasons not related to class status 
(eighteen cases or 12%) than it was that the court would outright deny 
the request for certification. 
                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. HILARY HEHMAN, CLASS CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM 
THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5 (2009), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
reference/documents/classaction-certification.pdf. 
 119. Id. at 7–8. 
 120. Id. at 8. 
 121. The percentage of certification grants in post-CAFA cases was 41%.  However, the motion 
was still pending in 17% of the cases.  Thus, the percentage of grants is almost certain to increase.  If 
half of the pending cases lead to grants, the post-CAFA certification rate will be roughly 48%. 
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Table 4: Outcomes When Class Certification Sought 





Certification Granted 63 17 80 
Certification Denied 12a 5 17 
Still Pending 3 7 10 
Voluntary Dismissal 
Not Class-Related 15 3 18 
Defense Win 
Precertification 3 4 7 
Class Treatment 
Abandoned 2 3 5 
Dismissed For Failure 
to Prosecute 2 0 2 
Other 9 2 11 
a This category includes one case in which the class allegations were stricken by the court. 
These Oklahoma findings are generally consistent with findings from 
Phase Two of the FJC study.  In the federal study sample, the court 
granted thirty of seventy (43%) motions to certify.122  The principal 
difference is found in the denial rate: federal judges denied the motion to 
certify in eighteen of seventy (26%) cases.123  Roughly stated, federal 
judges seem only slightly less inclined to grant certification but 
considerably more inclined to enter an order formally denying it.  The 
California data are quite similar.  The grant rate in California was 46%; 
the denial rate was 19%.124 
When certification is granted, there is a very high likelihood that the 
case will result in a settlement.  Table 5 presents data on the outcomes of 
cases in which the trial court granted a motion for class certification.  Out 
of the eighty cases that were class certified, a total of fifty-nine (74%) 
resulted in a settlement, with twelve still pending.  Only nine of the 
eighty certified cases have concluded with something other than a 
settlement.  Just two were tried, and one of those settled after trial.  Only 
one was decertified.  Thus, if form holds, it is likely that most of the 
pending cases will also terminate in a settlement. 
                                                     
 122. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 67, at 11. 
 123. Id. 
 124. HEHMAN, supra note 118, at 9. 
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Table 5: Case Outcomes in Certified Class Actions 





Certified for Litigation, 
Then Settled 21 3 24 
Certified for Settlement 
and Settled 28 7 35 
Still Pending 8 4 12 
Decertified 1 0 1 
Reversed 2 0 2 
Defense Motion Win 1 0 1 
Plaintiff Motion Win 1a 0 1 
Tried 1b 1 2 
Dismissed for Lack of 
Prosecution 0 2 2 
a The class obtained summary judgment on liability.  The amount of damages was tried. 
b This case was tried to a jury verdict for the class but later settled, with court approval, after 
entry of final judgment. 
The finding that most certified class actions in Oklahoma settle 
should come as no surprise.  Early federal-court empirical work found 
that most certified class actions settle.125  In the FJC’s preliminary report 
on Phase Two of its CAFA study, it reported that every certified class 
action in the population of cases had terminated in a settlement.126  The 
California OCR study found a settlement rate of 89% in certified class 
actions.127 
One important question posed earlier is whether CAFA might have a 
disparate impact on contested “litigation classes” as compared to 
settlement classes.  In a contested class action, the defendant will have an 
incentive to remove from a state with lax certification practices.  But in a 
settlement class, both sides would have an incentive to forego CAFA 
jurisdiction and seek class certification and settlement approval in 
whatever state court (with jurisdiction) would present the most favorable 
combination of certification and settlement approval practices.  To put it 
                                                     
 125. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking 
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 180 (1996) (finding approved certified class settlements in 100% 
of cases in the Southern District of Florida, 88% of cases in the Northern District of California, 71% 
of cases in the Northern District of Illinois, and 62% of cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
during a two-year period). 
 126. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 67, at 10–15. 
 127. See HEHMAN, supra note 118, at 23. 
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more concretely, if lawyers continued to think that Oklahoma state courts 
were good places to get settlement classes certified and approved, then 
there would be no reason to expect CAFA to negatively impact those 
cases and filing rates of settlement classes should stay constant pre- and 
post-CAFA.  On the other hand, we might expect CAFA to reduce the 
number of contested class actions in Oklahoma under the view that 
plaintiffs would be deterred from filing them knowing that defendants 
would be likely to remove them to federal court. 
Based on one measure, settlement-class activity would appear to be 
holding steady in Oklahoma.  As shown in Table 6, pre-CAFA, 46% of 
settled class actions had been filed as settlement classes as opposed to 
contested “litigation classes.”  Post-CAFA, that figure was only slightly 
higher at 47%.  If it holds,128 these data would stand in contrast with a 
long-term trend in federal court in which the ratio of settlement classes to 
litigation classes has been increasing.129 




(N = 63) 
Post–CAFA 
(N = 17) 
Total 
(N = 80) 
Certified for 
Litigation 34 (54%) 9 (53%) 43 (53.8%) 
Certified for 
Settlement 29 (46%) 8 (47%) 37 (46.2%) 
 
In absolute terms, though, settlement-class activity in Oklahoma 
would appear to be falling drastically.  From January 1, 2001, to 
February 17, 2005, plaintiffs filed twenty-nine cases in which a 
settlement class was eventually certified.  That calculates to a rate of one 
every fifty-two days.  From February 18, 2005 (CAFA’s effective date) 
to December 31, 2008, plaintiffs filed eight cases in which a settlement 
class was eventually certified, resulting in a rate of one every 177 days.  
Viewed from this perspective, it does not appear that lawyers are seeking 
out the Oklahoma state courts as a place to tee up post-CAFA settlement 
classes for class certification and settlement approval. 
                                                     
 128. There are four post-CAFA certification motions still pending in Oklahoma.  One is for a 
settlement class; the other three are for litigation classes.  If all four are granted, then the percentage 
of classes filed as settlement classes will actually drop, to 42.8%. 
 129. See Willging & Lee, supra note 85, at 791–92. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
During the past decade, Oklahoma gained a reputation as a state with 
a favorable class action environment.  A combination of lenient 
certification standards, favorable choice-of-law rules, and generous 
settlement-approval practices made Oklahoma an emerging destination 
for forum-shopping class action lawyers.  In short, Oklahoma was one of 
the states squarely in CAFA’s cross hairs.  Since CAFA took effect, class 
action filings in Oklahoma have decreased significantly, suggesting that, 
at least in Oklahoma, CAFA has had its intended impact.  At the same 
time, though, class action filings in the Oklahoma federal courts have 
also decreased significantly.  National federal-court data collected by the 
FJC show that, while diversity class actions increased post-CAFA, the 
increase has been much larger in some federal courts than it has been in 
others.  Taken together, the Oklahoma and federal-court data suggest that 
the plaintiffs who used to forum shop their nationwide state-law class 
actions at the state level now may be forum shopping them at the federal 
level instead. 
